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Abstract 
The article investigates EU-China trade and investment relations, highlighting the importance of their 
partnership for the global economy. The article argues that Covid-19 is an accelerating factor of 
existing trends, analysing EU-China relations as empirical evidence. It will address the institutional 
and legal framework of EU-China trade and investment relations. The article will use primary and 
secondary sources to inform the research. It will benefit from an interdisciplinary approach, 
combining both legal and political literatures. The analysis is based on EU-China trade and investment 
relations, as reported by EU’s official documents and is divided into three main sections. The first 
section gives an overview of economic interactions between EU-China. The second section provides an 
analysis of the main documents between the EU and China before the pandemic. The third section is 
dedicated to showing how the relations between the two actors continued during Covid-19 pandemic.  
Keywords: Covid-19, EU-China relations, investment, trade  
Introduction 
The past few months have been characterised by the outbreak of the Covid-19 
pandemic. The public health crisis affected the entire world, having serious impacts 
not only on personal and health issues, but also on economy and markets. Although we 
are far from being out of the woods, an early investigation of the role of the pandemic 
on trade and investment relations can be put forward.  
Many questions arise at this stage. What role does the Covid-19 pandemic play in the 
international arena? Can a pandemic be accounted for as an economic, as well as a 
public health crisis? Different theories that debate the exogenous or endogenous value 
of the Covid-19 crisis are showing up in the academic debate (Petit, 2020). Certainly, 
these are unprecedented time. This is true for different reasons. Firstly, it is the first 
time that China is in such a central position of influence and power in the international 
arena. Secondly, it is the first time that the EU is a global power and economy, capable 
of influencing the global markets. After almost one year into the pandemic, most of the 
authors and commentators have taken two different stances on the role of Covid-19 in 
the international framework. Many see the pandemic as a “game-changer” in the 
international system (Duclos, 2020; Vinjamuri et al., 2020). Others claim that Covid-




In this article EU-China relations are analysed as empirical evidence to demonstrate 
that Covid-19 is an accelerating factor of existing trends. The aim is to address the 
institutional and legal framework of EU-China trade and investment relations. In 
addition, we ask if and how Covid-19 is affecting bilateral relations between the two 
global actors, in order to determine whether the pandemic is changing trade and 
investment relations between the EU and China or whether it is simply accelerating 
already existing trends. On the basis of official EU documentation we assess whether 
the current situation with Covid-19 pandemic is in line with the policies adopted in the 
past (see Damro et al., 2018; Freeman, 2021). The article consists of three sections. 
The first gives an overview of economic interactions between EU-China, taking into 
consideration trade in goods and service, and investments; the second provides a brief 
overview of the major steps towards institutional cooperation in trade and investment 
between the EU and China before the outburst of the pandemic; and the third is 
dedicated to showing how the relations between the two actors continued during the 
Covid-19 pandemic.  
EU-China trade and investment relations in a nutshell  
The EU and China together account for one-third of world economic output. (Fang & 
Shakur, 2018, European Commission, 2021b). Therefore, a clear set of norms and 
provisions together with a properly defined dispute settlement mechanism is necessary 
for the stakeholders of both sides. China and the EU have developed their bilateral 
relations with an average annual rate of growth of more than 20% (European 
Commission, 2021b). Even though the 2008 crisis has contracted global trade, 
bilateral relations between the two actors have not suffered like other markets, 
showing an important steadiness to unexpected market changes. Indeed, the 2008 
growth rate was at 19.5% (Hongjian & Tianqi, 2010). In 2019, China was the EU’s 
second largest partner for trade, and the EU was China’s biggest partner (EEAS Press 
Team, 2020). Trade in goods was worth over €1.5 billion a day in the past year, and the 
total value of export from the EU to China accounted for €198 billion, while the import 
amount was €362 billion (EEAS Press Team, 2020). In 2018, services export from the 
EU to China was worth €46 billion, while China exported €30 billion (EEAS Press 
Team, 2020). Especially after China’s accession to the WTO system, the EU has been 
importing products from China more than its counterpart has.  
These figures demonstrate the impressive scale of trade exchange between Europe and 
China over the past decades. The relations of the EU and China have been strictly 
interrelated, especially in the industrial sector, as many European companies wanted 
to reduce their production costs, increasing the use of subcontracts for producing 
components in China (Farnell, 2016). During the past decades, Chinese and European 
industries have been relying on each other, creating an interdependent web of 
connections, that have benefitted from the different characteristics of the two markets. 
If in the early 2000s textile was the predominant sector, a few years later the scenario 
changed towards an interdependence in the areas of electronic, information 
technology and telecommunication equipment (Farnell, 2016). Similarly, the Chinese 
market has become extremely attractive for European exports.  
China and the EU have different access levels in their domestic market. Indeed, the EU 
has seen China as a “free-rider” on the openness of the multilateral system, without 
granting the same benefits (Farnell, 2016). In contrast, Europe’s regular use of WTO’s 
trade defence instruments has been considered by Chinese officials as an unfair 
Barillà, ANZJES 13(2) 
 
44 
measure (Farnell, 2016). China sees it as another side of the non-recognition of its 
market status. Nevertheless, it is clear that these concerns are similar to other issues 
between China and developed countries (Farnell, 2016). Despite the differences and 
the possible tensions that might rise, though, the EU and China succeeded in pursuing 
their goal to develop further cooperation (Geeraerts, 2019).  
These issues have been at the core of the dialogue between the two partners. The next 
sections show how these topics have been incorporated and dealt with in the official 
documents of the partnership, as well as in the negotiations of the new EU-China 
Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI). 
Key steps towards a more integrated partnership  
EU-China relations have always been driven by economic interests (Casarini, 2019). 
Other elements of cooperation like security and defence have been added throughout 
the years. Diplomatic relations started in 1975 (Casarini, 2019; Men, 2008). Ten years 
later, the EU and China signed the Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation 
between the European Economic Community and the People's Republic of China 
(1985). This is the only official agreement that exists between the two parties, unless 
considering the bilateral relations between China and the single Member States. 
Nonetheless, one of the first institutional fora of cooperation was the EU-China 
Summit. In 1998, the EU and China sat together in London for the first EU-China 
Summit (EU, 1998b). The main points of discussion were centred around possible 
solutions for fostering Chinese integration in Europe and in the global economy, 
supporting China’s transition to an open society (EU, 1998a).  
Since the first EU-China Summit, the dialogue between the two actors has witnessed a 
significant increase in terms of both frequency and width of areas covered. One of the 
first steps towards a more integrated partnership was characterised by the EU 
Commission policy paper on the strategy with China in 2003 (European Commission, 
2003a). The policy paper was mainly focused on strengthening cooperation in political 
and security related fields, including sharing responsibilities in promoting global 
governance, supporting China’s transition to an open society based on the rule of law 
and respect for human rights, and promoting Chinese economic opening domestically 
and externally, as well as fostering cooperation in trade and investment sectors 
(Casarini, 2019; European Commission, 2003b).  
A major step towards a more integrated partnership between the EU and China was 
certainly represented by the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation of 
2013 (EEAS, 2013). The Strategic Agenda was a document issued by the EU to foster 
cooperation and integration between the two actors in different sectors. This document 
was drafted taking into account China’s 12th Five Year Plan (China’s National People’s 
Congress, 2011; Hongjian & Tianqi, 2010; Levinger & Hansakul, 2016). The Strategic 
Agenda was centred on three main areas: I. Peace and Cooperation; II. Prosperity; III. 
Sustainable Development; People-to-People Exchanges.1 It served as a roadmap for 
the relations until 2019, opening the dialogue on the negotiations of the CAI.  
 
1 To achieve its goals, the document identified the following areas of cooperation: trade and investment; industry 
and information; agriculture; transport and infrastructure; science, technology and innovation; space and 
aerospace; energy; urbanisation; climate change and environment protection; ocean; regional policy; social 
progress; public policy; cooperation and global development; culture, education and youth; facilitation of people-




It is clear that the EU is trying to set up an effective strategy for dealing with the 
presence of Chinese FDIs in its Member States. Evidence of Brussels’ interest towards 
China does not only include the already mentioned Agenda 2020, but also the 2016 
Joint Communication on Elements for a new EU strategy on China (European 
Commission, 2016), the Council Conclusion (General Secretariat of the Council, 2016), 
the 2018 European Parliament Resolution on the state of EU-China relations (Gehrke, 
2019). The main focus of all these documents is the economic relations between the 
two actors. It is interesting to highlight the intensive use of terms like “reciprocity” and 
“level-playing field”. They are indicators of the positive and confident attitude towards 
the economic relations among the two actors. The documents aim at expressing the 
will for enhancing market access for European private actors in China, advocating a 
more transparent and fair Chinese policy towards foreign companies (Gehrke, 2019).  
The main turning point of EU-China relations can be found in the 2019 Joint Statement 
(European Commission, 2019). This document presents a turning point in institutional 
relations between the two partners. The situation seems to have changed. The rhetoric 
is different. The EU’s perception of China has shifted (Freeman, 2021). After Beijing’s 
interest in European countries, the presence of the BRI in the multilateral framework, 
and the increasing tensions on trade with the US, China has become a “systemic rival” 
and a “strategic competitor” (European Commission, 2019; Von Der Burchard, 2019). 
It means that the EU has changed its attitude towards its Eastern counterpart, 
acknowledging the imminent need for more defined and clear relations. The Joint 
Statement suggests ten actions (in areas such as climate change, technology, free trade, 
and sustainable development) to bring China and Europe closer, aligning their long-
term strategies. In particular, it is interesting to analyse the fifth action. Considering 
China as an equal, Europe is asking for more “balanced” and “reciprocal economic 
relations” (European Commission, 2019; Freeman, 2021).  
The document suggests that that this closer cooperation might be achieved by common 
engagement of Europe and China in the reform of the multilateral system. An example 
of the shared view of a reformed international community is the proposal for updated 
rules of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Indeed, the EU seeks a stronger 
commitment of Beijing’s government in multilateral fora like the joint working group 
on WTO reform, as evidence of its support to a common and shared vision. The reform 
of the multilateral system in international trade has been an intensively discussed topic 
among scholars and international institutions. In particular, the EU Commission has 
recently issued a concept paper (European Commission, 2018), proposing some key 
changes to the multilateral governance of the trade institution, sustained also by China. 
The EU Commission acknowledges the need for change, stating that the world has 
changed since the Uruguay Round. The WTO has been facing a deep crisis since the 
fall of the Doha Round (Hopewell, 2016; Qingjiang, 2013). The EU, then, proposes to 
update the entire system, making it more flexible to the different inputs of both private 
and public actors. Furthermore, Brussels believes that together with the engagement 
in the multilateral dimension, China and the EU should strengthen their bilateral 
relations, investing resources in trade defence tools (European Commission, 2016, 
2018, 2019).  
The analysis of Sino-EU relations is necessary to highlight the strategic importance of 
the two actors in the international system. At this stage, it can be affirmed that EU-
China relations have been characterised by a strong dialogue on trade and investment. 
Despite the EU’s 2019 reclassification of China as a systemic rival, the main debate has 
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remained unaltered, focusing on market access, reciprocity, level-playing field, as well 
as sustainable development. Cooperation on other multilateral fora like the WTO plays 
an important role, confirming the trade-oriented relations between the partners. The 
next section will address how EU-China relations developed during Covid-19 
pandemic. 
EU-China relations during the Covid-19 pandemic: old struggles 
or new challenges? 
The past few months have been characterised by new and unprecedented challenges, 
facing the emergence of the Covid-19 pandemic. Trade and investment relations 
between China and the EU have certainly been affected, as well as the entire global 
economy (Godement, 2021). Even though the long-term consequences of the pandemic 
are far from being known, it is possible to analyse what kinds of responses and 
measures have characterised the relations between the two actors during this 
challenging time. Nonetheless, it needs to be emphasised that the health crisis is still 
ongoing. In this sense, the situation can rapidly change and evolve. This section will 
give an overview of the main events that have occurred in EU-China relations since the 
outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic.  
China is considered the point of origin of the spread of Covid-19. Accordingly, global 
attention was focused on China, the only country at that time that was facing the 
economic and public health issues connected to the breakout of the new virus. The EU 
and its Member States provided China with over 50 tonnes of medical supplies in 
January (European Commission, 2020a). The EU maintained a low profile in sending 
medical aids to China, as requested by the Chinese government (Institut français des 
relations internationales, 2020). Nonetheless, a different approach was taken by the 
Chinese side. Indeed, when the Covid-19 outbreak in Europe necessitated the various 
lockdowns, Chinese assistance was not as subtle as the European was. Chinese 
assistance came from different sources, from the central government to public and 
private companies, together with local Chinese communities (Institut français des 
relations internationales, 2020). Together with medical assistance, China arranged a 
number of videoconferences with governments to share experience on the fight against 
Covid-19. In this sense, Chinese aid did not pass unnoticed. Tailored messages for 
recipient countries both in Chinese characters and in the local languages were printed 
on the boxes(Institut français des relations internationales, 2020). It is interesting to 
highlight how China tried to develop a mask diplomacy and a consistent narrative 
during the outbreak of Covid-19 in Europe (Chen & Molter, 2020; Institut français des 
relations internationales, 2020; Verma, 2020; Wong, 2020).  
According to the European Council on Foreign Relations’ dataset (Busse et al., 2020), 
Chinese medical donations in Europe account for 148 individual medical supplies.2 
Even if this is a non-exhaustive list of donations, it still gives a sense of the relations of 
China and EU Member States during the pandemic. Nonetheless, the health crisis did 
not stop the institutional dialogue either. Indeed, despite difficulties and the 
postponement of meetings, the EU and China (virtually) continued their dialogue at 
 





the 22nd EU-China Summit. 3 During the Summit, Chinese and European delegations 
dealt with different issues, from Covid-19 responses, to economic and trade issues.4 In 
particular, the dialogue focused on the need to foster the negotiations of the CAI, as 
there is an urgent need for regulation on matters of state-owned enterprises, 
transparency on subsidies and rules tackling forced transfers of technology (European 
Council, 2020a). As stated by European Council President Charles Michel, the EU-
China partnership is decisive for the global economy, but it needs to be balanced in 
areas like market access, subsidies, regulatory issues, public procurement, forced 
technology transfers, level playing field and WTO reforms (European Council, 2020b). 
The EU Commission President von der Leyen clearly defined EU-China relations as 
crucial as “the COVID-pandemic and a number of major bilateral and multilateral 
challenges show, […] be it in terms of trade, climate, technology, and the defence of 
multilateralism. But for our relations to develop further, they must become more rules-
based and reciprocal, in order to achieve a real level playing-field” (European Council, 
2020a). After the Summit, the main points of discussion were summarised in the EU-
China Relations Factsheet (EEAS Press Team, 2020) by the European External Action 
Service (EEAS).  
The use of expressions such as transparency and reciprocity by President Charles 
Michel in the report suggests that despite the Covid-19 pandemic and the frictions 
caused by the health crisis, institutional relations have proceeded without noticeable 
disruptions or changes to the narrative (European Council, 2020a). An example that 
the pandemic did not stop the institutional relations between the two parties is the 
long-waited signature of the preliminary text of the CAI. At the end of 2020, the EU 
and China signed a preliminary version of the CAI (European Commission, 
2020b). After almost a decade of negotiation rounds, the signature of the CAI 
represents an important step for Sino-European bilateral relations. Instead of being 
seen as a replacement for individual Member States’ BITs and trade agreements, the 
CAI can be interpreted as a detailed legal framework that gives a unified approach on 
market access.  
On 22 January 2021 the EU published the preliminary text of the agreement (European 
Commission, 2021a). Already in its Preamble, it is evident how the expressions and 
general intentions of the CAI are in line with the previous documents. One of the major 
points of the CAI is its focus on sustainable development and the protection of labour 
rights. In particular, China commits to work through the ratification of the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) fundamental Conventions (European 
Commission, 2020b). Even though this is an important step forward in China’s 
recognition of international labour standards, these terms seem still too vague.  
The new agreement aims at “building […] economic relationship based on openness, 
reciprocity and mutual benefit, ensuring non-discrimination, a level playing field, 
transparency, and a predictable and rule-based investment environment” (European 
Commission, 2021a). This shows the intentions of both partners to continue the 
dialogue initiated in the past decades. Words like “reciprocity”, “transparency”, and 
 
3 German Chancellor Angela Merkel postponed the EU-China Summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping set for 
September 2020 in Leipzig due to the COVID-19 pandemic (Posaner, 3 June 2020) https://www.-
politico.eu/article/eu-china-summit-postponed-due-to-coronavirus-concerns/). 
4 The discussion touched different themes, like the conclusion of the EU-China CAI, the reform of WTO, the 
signature of the EU-China Agreement on Geographical Indications, issues on cybersecurity and disinformation, 
environment, Covid-19 response, the role of the World Health Organisation (WHO), Hong Kong, Human Rights, 
the Iran deal, Afghanistan, and the Korean Peninsula (European Council, 2020a). 
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“level playing field” continue to be part of the official language of EU-China relations. 
In particular, the document reaffirms that both partners should set rules to “reduce or 
eliminate the barriers to mutual investment” (European Commission, 2021a). This is 
one of the major objectives of the CAI. Reducing barriers and granting market access 
with clear and definite rules has been the cause of major delays on the signature of the 
agreement. The CAI, at this stage, acknowledges the market offer and liberalisation 
offer of the parties, without drastically changing the rules of the game (Godement, 
2021). In this sense, the CAI reinforces the already existing commitment of both parties 
with WTO rules (European Commission, 2021a). It may be too soon to address any 
comments on the effectiveness of the CAI provisions, or on their validity, but it is 
evident that the doubts that were anticipated during the negotiations remain.  
One of the main issues is the EU’s difficulty to maintain a unified front towards China. 
A clear example is the different positions of Member States on the Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI). Even though some authors argue that Sino-European relations are 
part of the BRI grand strategy (De Decker, 2019; Lo, 2018), the EU did not express its 
intention to be part of it. Nonetheless, many countries did sign memoranda of 
understanding to access the Chinese initiative.5 The CAI aims at providing a unified set 
of rules that each Member can apply in its relations with China. Nonetheless, the 
agreement does not seem to shed any light on the EU’s position on the BRI.  
Scholars have argued that the difficulty of reaching a final agreement on CAI is due to 
its intention of easing market access, the removal of discrimination between 
enterprises, and a clear and precise transparency mechanism (Karkanis, 2018; 
Levinger & Hansakul, 2016; Pelkmans et al., 2018). Despite the signature of the 
preliminary text, the practical definitions of these points are yet to be defined. Future 
negotiations on the Annexes of the CAI will bring more clarity. Another sensitive issue 
for both parties was the discussion on the dispute settlement mechanism (Yin, 2018). 
The CAI adopted a state-to-state dispute settlement, defined as an “enforcement 
mechanism”, together with a “monitoring mechanism”, that should prevent issues to 
escalate at a dispute level (European Commission, 2020b). Previous bilateral 
agreements used too vague terms, that often lead to inconsistent interpretation by 
arbitral tribunals (Abgaryan, 2018). Therefore, it seems reasonable to affirm that the 
success of both the monitoring and the enforcement mechanisms will determine the 
success of the whole CAI.  
After having analysed the themes that are at the core of Sino-European institutional 
trade and investment relations, it is evident that the pandemic did not substantially 
modify the debate. The main themes that have characterised the debate of EU-China 
relations have remained unaltered after the emergence of Covid-19. A clear piece of 
evidence is the preliminary text of the CAI. The main aims and objectives of the 
agreement stated in the Preamble are the same that can be found in previous 
documents. It can be claimed, then, that the pandemic may have accelerated the 
already existing debate. In this sense, the final signature of the CAI proves that.  
 
5 At the time of writing, Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, 





Covid-19 has greatly impacted all aspects of our world. International trade and 
investments are no different. Therefore, understanding how the pandemic has been 
affecting trade and investment relations between two major players in the 
international arena seems necessary. This article sustained the claim that the 
pandemic is not substantially modifying international relations. Covid-19, instead, can 
be considered as an accelerating factor in institutional relations. To this end, the article 
analysed official documents of the EU related to its relations with China. In particular, 
the article focused on a thematic review of the official documents, looking at possible 
alteration of their language, as well as more substantial evolution in the official debate.  
After looking at the volume of trade and investment between the two partners, we 
began with an analysis of the major official documents from 1985 to 2020. The analysis 
highlighted a shift in the EU’s perception of China. Until 2019, the main language used 
by the EU to describe its relations with China related to the realm of cooperation. After 
that, in the 2019 Joint Statement the EU considers China as a systemic rival. This 
change of perception, though, is antecedent to the pandemic, and has not changed 
since the emergence of the virus. Furthermore, the plans for the CAI seemed unaltered, 
as the preliminary text signed in December 2020 covers the same topics as the previous 
documents, despite a heated public debate, involving EU institutions on issues like 
global health and mask diplomacy. 
It seems reasonable, then, to affirm that the Covid-19 pandemic seemingly has not 
significantly altered institutional relations between China and the EU. Nonetheless, 
the limitations of this analysis are clear. First, the time factor must be considered. Only 
few months have passed since the outbreak of Covid-19. It is too soon to claim certainty 
of results from the analysis of post-pandemic institutional responses, or to prove any 
consistent alteration in institutional relations. In addition, the analysis mainly focused 
on a qualitative analysis of the EU’s official documents. More work needs to be done to 
include data from Chinese media and official sources. Eventually, this analysis will 
serve as the starting point for further research into the institutional effects of the 
Covid-19 pandemic on trade and investment between the EU and China.  
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